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Abstract 
 Neuroscience offers a unique opportunity to elucidate the role of mental phenomena, 
including consciousness. However the place of such phenomena in explanations of human 
behavior is controversial. For example, consciousness has been construed in varied and 
conflicting forms, making it difficult to represent it in meaningful ways without committing 
researchers to one species of consciousness or another, with vastly different implications for 
hypothesis development, methods of study, and interpretation of findings. We explore the 
conceptual foundations of different explications of consciousness and consider alternative ways 
for studying its role in research. In the end, although no approach is flawless or dominates all 
others in every way, we are convinced that any viable approach must take into account, if not 
privilege, the self in the sense of representing the subjective, first-person process of self as 
observer and knower of one’s own actions and history, and the feelings and meanings attached to 
these. The most promising frameworks in this regard are likely to be some variant of non-
reductive monism, or perhaps a kind of naturalistic dualism that remains yet to be developed 
coherently. 
Key words: consciousness, neuroscience, organizational behavior, dualism, monism, 
reductionism, mental events, qualia, folk psychology 
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What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind. (Homer Simpson, quoting George 
Berkeley). 
“It is certain that this me, that is my soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely and truly distinct 
from my body”. (Descartes, Meditations Metaphysiques, p. 222). 
“…you, your joys and sorrows, your memories and ambitions, your sense of personal identity 
and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their 
associated molecules”. (Crick, 1994, p. 3). 
We ourselves are large-scale, complex instances of something both objectively physical from 
outside and subjectively mental from inside. (Nagel, 2012, p. 42). 
In recent times, there has been a veritable explosion of interest in applying neuroscientific 
insights and methodological approaches to questions related to social science research (e.g. 
Bagozzi et al., 2013; Salvador and Folger, 2009; Waldman, Balthazard, and Peterson, 2011). 
Advances in neuroscience technologies have also been accompanied by significant 
methodological debates regarding the limits of inference of neuroscience research (e.g. Kosslyn, 
1999; for a recent debate, see Kievit et al., 2011a,b; Bagozzi, 2011a, Barrett, 2011). Further, our 
increasing knowledge of the brain has moved a number of more fundamental questions about the 
nature of individual subjective experiences, consciousness, morality, value, free will, and indeed 
just what it means to be human, from the domain of abstract philosophy into more mainstream 
scientific discourse. These questions have been explored in depth by many neuroscientists and 
philosophers (e.g. Block, 2007a; Burge, 2007; Crick, 1994; Damasio, 1994, 2010; Dennett, 2006; 
Nagel, 2012; Tellis, 2011) 
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 Within the organizational and management science literature, a number of scholars have 
provided general discussions of the role of the human brain and how neuroscience might benefit 
the science and practice of management (e.g. Ashkanasy, Becker, & Waldman, 2014; Becker, 
Cropanzano, & Sanfey; 2011). Such work has on occasion approached issues regarding the 
possible limits of inference from neuroscience data (i.e., what it can tell us about physical brain 
activity itself, see Lee, Senior, & Butler, 2012; Senior, Lee, & Butler, 2011). Further, Healey and 
Hodgkinson (2014) provide a useful critical realist framework for neuroscience in management 
and organizational research, which views cognition as embodied and socially situated, and 
neuroscience as one building block for knowledge development. This notable work aside, 
however, there is a conspicuous lack of attention paid in the management/organizational research 
literature to many of the important philosophical issues raised above – that is, what does brain 
activity mean? Whereas commentaries have appeared on occasion critiquing the ability of 
neuroscience to explain complex organizational phenomena (e.g. Lindebaum, 2015; Lindebaum 
& Zundel, 2013), the reductionist ideas criticized in such work merely sketch but one of the 
significant philosophical implications of neuroscientific advances. However, a coherent 
understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of research into mental phenomena and 
consciousness by use of neuroscience methods is of fundamental importance to the future 
development of theoretically and practically useful organizational research. We herein 
substantively deepen the current level of philosophical discussion in organizational and 
management science, and give guidance for empirical research in this growing area.  
 Consider the following questions. If some alien was able to make a perfect copy of you, 
right down to the very last subatomic particle, would that copy-you have the same mental 
experience or consciousness as the real-you? In essence, would it “be” you? Similarly, how 
would the “transporter” in Star Trek work? If it disassembled your physical body and brain, and 
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perfectly reassembled them somewhere else, how would it transport your consciousness? Would 
“you” still be “you”? Or, imagine you were dying, and technology allowed you to “port” your 
consciousness into an android, or even into a totally virtual world inside a computer. How would 
you do this? What, exactly, would you “port”? Next, consider what evidence you have that 
anyone other than yourself even has consciousness. What do you observe other than other 
people’s physical features and behaviors? Does this make them “conscious”? Are you sure? Is 
your dog conscious? How does that square with your answers to the earlier questions? Finally, 
imagine we were able to create a perfect replica of a physical human brain, housed inside a 
perfect replica of a human body. Would this simulacrum be conscious, experiencing the world 
subjectively, like you? Or would it be a non-conscious “zombie”? These are classical thought 
experiments that provide an entry point into thinking about the nature of our concept of the mind, 
and its relationship to the physical world, including our brain (e.g., Dennett, 2013).  
 There are of course various ways of addressing such issues, the main points of which we 
will briefly introduce readers to in due course. One thing however is certain, these questions are 
not simply interesting ways of passing the time. The question of whether the mind and brain are 
the same thing is nothing less than the defining question of our time for the future of 
organizational (and by extension, social) science. First, the growing body of researchers 
interested in applying neuroscientific research methods to organizational research questions must 
address the question of exactly what purpose such research serves (Healey & Hodgkinson, 2014). 
For example, if it can be shown that physical brain events map directly to mental events, which 
actually exist and can have causal impacts on other mental and physical events or properties, then 
one must wonder what purpose neuroscientific approaches to organizational research serve. This 
is because in a social context such as organizational life, it could be argued that it is far more 
important to understand and explore higher-level psychological, social, or organizational theory 
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concepts as the primary drivers of important organizational consequences, than physical brain 
activity. This is seemingly at the root of criticism of neuroscientific organizational research by 
authors such as Lindebaum and Zundel (2013). But, if it can be shown that considering mental 
events as “real” is questionable, then this throws into doubt virtually the entirety of the last 
century of organizational research. In such a case, almost none of the concepts explored in 
existing research would be justifiably “real”, and as such it is hard to see how it can be reasonable 
that such concepts can have causal effects on the world (Kim, 1993). This in turn has impacts on 
how we can have any valid knowledge of the organizational world without incorporating 
knowledge of the physical brain’s role. At best, such concepts as  “satisfaction”, “charisma”, 
“leadership”, “intention”, and “emotion” (among the seemingly thousands of others) could be 
thought of as metaphors, possibly connected to nothing real at all (and thus unmeasurable by their 
nature), which throws into doubt the idea that we have any knowledge about organizations at all. 
Or as philosopher Fodor (1990, p. 156) says; “if…[the causal power of mental concepts is 
not]…literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false and it’s the end 
of the world”. 
By ignoring the question of the relationship between mind and body, or worse being 
unaware of it, organizational research risks becoming at best a sterile irrelevance, and at worst 
misleading or harmful. Take for example the now-infamous 2011 New York Times op-ed written 
by Martin Lindstrom, entitled “You Love Your iPhone, Literally”. This article drew inference 
from brain imaging studies to suggest that individuals feel the same emotion towards their mobile 
phones and other devices as they feel towards humans that they love. This claim exemplifies the 
naïve understanding of exactly what neuroscientific data can tell us about complex psychological 
and social phenomena, and was devastatingly debunked by a letter to the NYT by Russell 
Poldrack and 44 other neuroscientists a week later. Whereas this example is from the popular 
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press, peer-reviewed organizational / management science literature is also far from perfect in 
this regard.   
 Of course, whereas many management scholars would likely benefit from enhanced 
technical knowledge of neuroscientific methods, we maintain that it is greater understanding of 
the philosophical implications of neuroscientific research that would be most beneficial at this 
time. As such, it is disconcerting that so little consideration has heretofore been paid to the issues 
that we raise in this article. Perhaps organizational scholars are in agreement with Stephen 
Hawking, who states outright that “philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern 
developments in science…Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our 
quest for knowledge” (Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010, p. 5; c.f., Silbersweig, 2015). Yet this seems 
a strangely hubristic position to take, particularly given how often cherished scientific theories 
are supplanted. Rather, we concur with Thomas Nagel: 
“One of the legitimate tasks of philosophy is to investigate the limits of even the best 
developed and most successful forms of contemporary scientific knowledge…intellectual 
humility requires that we resist the temptation to assume that tools of the kind we have 
now are in principle sufficient to understand the universe as a whole. Pointing out their 
limits is a philosophical task, whoever engages with it, rather than part of the internal 
pursuit of science…[it is a task of]…trying to recognize what can and cannot in principle 
be understood by certain existing methods” (Nagel, 2012, p. 3-4). 
It is our view that, as yet, organizational scholarship has not considered such issues in enough 
depth, and it is this that we intend to remedy herein. Specifically, we begin by outlining the main 
philosophical lines of argument regarding the relationship of the mind to the brain. Subsequently, 
we develop a multi-level framework for organizational research that allows us to take account of 
evidence for both mental events, and physical brain events, and how they can be integrated into a 
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holistic research methodology. Of course, we do not claim to solve the mind-brain problem, 
which may very well be intractable. However, the approach we outline here allows researchers to 
move forward in a more coherent and informed fashion, and clearly sets out a place for 
neuroscience in social science research, and perhaps more importantly a plausible place for 
organizational research itself as a valid avenue for knowledge development in the contemporary 
world. 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS: PHYSICALISM, MIND, AND BRAIN 
In order to begin to address the questions of exactly what neuroscientific research can tell us 
about human, social, and organizational phenomena, we must first address a critical philosophical 
question. Specifically, is there anything more to the mind than its material – i.e., those nerve cells 
and molecules cited by Crick (1994)? In order to address the above question, we must introduce a 
number of critical philosophical concepts, which frame the different positions on this issue, 
beginning with physicalism (with respect to the terms materialism and physicalism, we will 
regard them here as synonyms; see Stoljar [2015] for a history and comparison of the two 
concepts.). For purposes of discussion, we can identify three approaches to thinking about 
consciousness which contrast purely physical with purely mental, and with mixtures of the two 
approaches (see Figure 1). One, dualism, has perhaps the oldest history and is the most intuitive, 
being especially considered in Enlightenment times due to Descartes. Descartes advocated 
substance dualism, the theory that consciousness and the brain are two different kinds of things. 
The brain is physical, consciousness is in some sense non-physical, even supernatural in some 
accounts. Property dualism, as proposed in one variant by Nagel1 (2002, 2012), posits that people 
observe physical reality objectively from the outside, and mental reality subjectively from the 
inside; here consciousness and the brain are still separate substances, but both are in some sense 
natural, yet consciousness is neither physical nor supernatural. Chalmers (2010) advocates a 
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somewhat similar view, termed naturalistic dualism, where there are objective physical entities 
and subjective non-physical entities useful for understanding our minds, and both are natural. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Dualism in one sense sets the tone for the other two perspectives on consciousness shown 
in Figure 1. Idealism claims that all things are ideas, and the mental is the foundation for reality 
(Guyer & Horstmann, 2015), whereas substance monism asserts that all things are physical 
(Schaffer, 2016). It is difficult at this time to envision how idealism might inform empirical 
scientific discourse on neuroscience applied to social science research, so we will not have any 
more to say about it here. 
 Substance monism has evolved in two directions: reductive physicalism and non-
reductive physicalism. Both variants maintain that all things are physical. But reductive 
physicalism sees conscious properties as physical properties, whereas non-reductive physicalism 
allows that (some) conscious properties cannot be completely reduced to the physical. The most 
developed instances of substance monism in philosophy, and the most frequently followed forms 
of substance monism guiding neuroscience, are elaborations on themes of functionalism. The 
general form of functionalism for conscious states, events, or processes is a causal one, where 
consciousness gets its meaning from the role it plays in a causal system with (physical) inputs 
and outputs, and perhaps other conscious states, events, or processes (e.g., Levin, 2013; see also 
Block, 2007 a, b). More specifically, a hypothesized conscious state, event, or process plays an 
intermediary role between a causal input, such as found in experimental manipulations, and its 
relationship to causal outputs, such as behavioral performances. The intermediary role may be 
represented as a construct or ideal, sometimes referred to as a hypothetical construct. 
Intermediary roles can be complex, such as found in cognitive or emotional processes (for an 
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example of such a process in an experiment where three cognitive processes interact in a 2x3x2 
design, see Figure 1c, Bagozzi, 2011a; Tam et al., 2010). 
 More specifically, under reductive functionalism, the meaning of a conscious construct is 
achieved by its dependence on a physical manipulation and the role it has in producing a physical 
output, where the conscious construct operates on the information in the manipulation to specify 
a functional property. Under non-reductive functionalism, the meaning of a conscious construct is 
attained by its role connecting a causal input to a causal output, and where the conscious 
construct relates to a functional property in a way weaker than identity. We will give specific 
elaborations of functional accounts of consciousness in the latter half of this article. 
 Other forms of substance monism should be briefly mentioned for completeness (see 
Figure 1). According to the identity thesis, mind and brain are identical (Smart, 2014). 
Eliminativism claims that all or some supposedly conscious states do not exist (Ramsey, 2013). 
Emergentism maintains that consciousness appears or originates somehow out of physical brain 
processes, but is not reducible to them (O’Connor & Want, 2015). Finally, anomalous monism 
asserts that consciousness must be physical because psychological laws cannot exist in the same 
sense as physical laws, yet consciousness can cause and be caused by physical events (Yalowitz, 
2014). Unlike reductive and non-reductive functionalism, these species of substance monism are 
difficult to apply in neuroscience approaches and will not be considered further herein. 
The philosophical variants of mind are obviously numerous and complicated to both 
discuss and comprehend. Each is also controversial and subject to multiple objections and 
defenses (see entries and references in the Appendix). To date, there seems to be little consensus 
on this topic. As a consequence, we have chosen to discuss what neuroscience research can 
inform us concerning social science research by focusing on the approaches that dominate inquiry 
in cognitive neuroscience at the present: namely, physicalism of both reductive and nonreductive 
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variants, as expressed in functionalism, and close alternatives. But first let us explore a way of 
framing some broad issues as a prelude to our consideration of more specific methodological and 
empirical issues in the latter half of the article. 
Figure 2 presents a very simplified conceptual schematic of what we term a “naïve 
model” of the relationships between our brain, our mind, and our behavior. Specifically, we have 
a physical brain, which somehow plays some role in our experiencing of our thoughts and 
feelings, which play a role in our behavior (the paths represented by arrows a and c). At the same 
time, most people are comfortable with thinking that there are some behaviors that are what they 
might term “automatic” or “instinctual” (e.g., recoiling from a threat), which do not require 
conscious experiencing to result in behavior (path e; see e.g., Le Doux, 2015). Similarly, 
typically, many people think that the environment we live in can produce some of our mental 
experiences, which are processed by the brain (paths d and b), but, and at the same time, some 
aspects of the environment can be processed without conscious experience – usually termed, 
“subconsciously” (path f). In this naïve model, the mind (i.e., an umbrella term relating to our 
subjective conscious experiencing of the world around us, and our thoughts and feelings, some of 
which become habitual and automatic) plays some mediating role between our physical brains 
and our functional behaviors, some of the time.  
[Figure 2 about here.] 
Obviously, the naïve model in Figure 2 appears to contradict a substance monist view, 
being as it posits some non-physical entity of “mind”, which plays an active causal role in our 
behaviors. However, substance monism holds that everything that exists is physical, and that our 
mental experiences and consciousness are, subject to certain caveats, identical to their 
corresponding brain materials and interactions. As such to maintain a substance monist view, we 
must eliminate or in some way reduce everything that is above the dashed line which demarks the 
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physical from the non-physical, or else argue that seemingly subjective experience supervenes on 
the material (e.g., Kim, 2000, 2005; see also entry in Appendix, and Figure 6b). Supervenience 
means in essence that our mental properties are wholly dependent on our physical properties, 
whereas not being exactly the same thing. However, even if this is the case, Kim (1993) claims to 
show that it is impossible for mental events (i.e. the mind) to have unique causal powers over and 
above physical events (i.e., the brain). Thus, we are left with our brain, our behavior, and the 
links between them (paths e and f). Of course, as our understanding of the universe has evolved, 
our understanding of exactly what counts as physical matter has also changed, but the key point 
regarding substance monism is that the entirety of that which exists is in some sense physical. 
Currently, we have no satisfactory way of conceptualizing our subjective mental experience as 
physical, so from this point of view we must conclude that it does not exist in the way it naïvely 
seems to exist to us (Figure 2). 
 Substance monism thus seems to jar with our intuitions, and our actual experiences, of 
being human, and as such considerable time has been spent in exploring how it comes to be that 
we seem to experience the world through what feels to us like a first-person subjective point of 
view. In other words, why does it “feel” like we are more than just brains responding to the 
environment? Just what actually is our conscious experience? Why does it feel like anything at 
all? Consider again the earlier example of a perfect simulacrum of a human, which is known as a 
philosophical zombie (or p-zombie). According to what we know about the physical brain, a p-
zombie would be functionally and biologically indistinguishable from a normal human. The 
problem therefore being that, if such a creature is logically possible, then a) how do we know 
anyone other than ourselves is conscious at all, and as such, b) how can subjective consciousness 
be defined in a physicalist way?  
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 The world of subjective experience, or “feeling”, is what philosophers term the 
phenomenological world, with actual subjective conscious experiences called qualia. Whereas 
numerous empirical scientists and philosophers have tried to reconcile the substance monist view 
with our subjective phenomenological experience in various ways (e.g. Pinker, 2015; Wegner, 
2002), one well-received and reasonably archetypal model has been provided by Dennett (e.g. 
Dennett, 1991; Dennett, 2003). It is impossible here to explain Dennett’s model in any brief way 
that does it justice, but in essence, his theory is that subjective consciousness we each experience 
is the result of multiple parallel brain activity responses to the myriad stimuli that make up the 
world, which create ”Multiple Drafts” of perception, some of which are then promoted to 
functional roles by the brain, which acts in this case like a virtual von Neumann machine (i.e., a 
serial information processing architecture using stored programs, but which can only process one 
instruction at a time). The “mind” is thus a collection of simplified evolved modules (e.g., 
ducking, avoiding predators), which partly act in fulfilling their hard-wired purpose, but are also 
on occasion enlisted to perform other functions. We present commentary in a concluding section 
to this article, on a similar approach to consciousness emerging in the neuroscience literature. 
  Models such as Dennett’s provide plausible explanations of how it comes to be that a 
purely physical neurobiological system could come to have what seems like a subjective 
consciousness. Whereas it is clearly substance monist in nature, Dennett (1991, see p. 459) resists 
the urge to classify his theory as solely fitting into one of the specific reductive categories 
introduced above (identity theory, eliminativism, reductive functionalism), suggesting that to do 
so is broadly meaningless, because it shares aspects of each. Nevertheless, the clear goal of 
Dennett’s and other such models is one of psychophysical reductionism, the specific claim that 
eventually consciousness, and thus by extension the mind itself, will be completely explainable 
by physics and chemistry (Nagel, 2012). In doing so, models such as Dennett’s redefine our 
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subjective phenomenological experience of consciousness to be at best some kind of useful 
fiction, a deception, misconception, or hallucination created by our brains as a result of their 
evolution, or at worst an unintended side effect of the complex system that is our brain. In 
essence, our subjective experience is considered from this point of view to be an illusion (Pinker, 
2015). After all, if mental experience is not physical, it cannot be real in the sense of the naïve 
model in Figure 2. Whereas this may be unsatisfying from the perspective of our actual 
experience of being human (i.e., we feel like there must be more to it than that), this type of 
model has the significant advantage of placing the study of the brain and mental experience into 
the realms of our current physicalist models of science.  
However, the advantages of psychophysical reductionism come at a heavy cost, which we 
must be willing to bear if we are to commit to this view. As alluded to above, this cost is 
seemingly nothing less than the removal of the concept of consciousness in scientific discourse as 
we actually experience it. Perhaps because of this, the claim of Dennett and others to have 
“explained” consciousness in this way has been challenged from different angles (see Dennett, 
2003). First, Pinker (2015), when discussing his own computational model of the mind (which 
shares many features with Dennett’s), claims outright that the question of how subjective 
experience and consciousness (which he terms sentience) emerge out of information processing 
“beats the heck out of me! I have…no idea of how to begin to look for a defensible answer, and 
neither does anybody else” (Pinker, 2015, p.146). He goes on to say, “but saying that we have no 
scientific explanation of sentience is not the same as saying that sentience does not exist at all. I 
am as certain that I am sentient as I am certain of anything.” (p. 148). This is what we might term 
the brute fact view of consciousness; that it is there, but we have no idea how or why, nor any 
idea of where to start looking (see also Fodor, 1990; Wright, 2000). Pinker claims that this does 
not impair our understanding of how the mind works (as does Wegner, 2002). Even if this is true 
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though, it seems to be an unsatisfying position to be in. Dennett (2003) suggests that both Pinker 
and Wright have misunderstood his theory as claiming consciousness itself does not exist. Be that 
as it may, at best Dennett appears to redefine consciousness away from our subjective mental 
phenomenological experience, claiming the identity of “conscious [experience are], information-
bearing events in the brain – since that’s all that’s going on” (Dennett, 1991, p. 459), and 
dedicates an entire chapter to dismissing qualia, claiming that they are “treacherous pitfalls” (p. 
433) and explicitly that “there are no such properties as qualia” (p. 455).  We consider qualia later 
in the article. 
Nagel (2002; 2012) provides similar criticisms to those of Pinker above, but rather than 
trying to defend conscious experience as simply a brute fact, he approaches the mind-body 
problem through the lens of analytic philosophy. This effort draws from Kripke (1980), which 
includes the statement, “Materialism, I think, must hold that a physical description of the world is 
a complete description of it, that any mental facts are ‘ontologically dependent’ on physical facts 
in the straightforward sense of following from them by necessity” (p. 155, emphasis added). 
So, a physicalist (i.e. substance monist), reductive functionalist account of consciousness 
(see Figure 1), such as Dennett’s, must in the end be eliminative to some extent, redefining our 
subjective experience of consciousness as an illusory outcome of other brain functions (e.g., 
information processing), concluding that mental events are physical events in the brain and 
nothing more. Thus, with scientific advances, we will be able to discover the necessary 
connections between mental and physical events, in the same way that science allowed us to 
understand once-mysterious things such as the molecular composition of water, and fire as 
oxidization. However, this is might be characterized as problematic, because consciousness does 
not seem to be constituted by physical brain states (i.e., necessary), but instead to be somehow 
produced by it – which is a contingent not a necessary relationship, implying that mental states 
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and brain states cannot be identical (Nagel, 2012). Gray sums this up in his explanation of why 
the problem of explaining consciousness is so difficult: “nothing that we know so far about 
behavior, physiology, the evolution of either behavior or physiology, or the possibilities of 
constructing automata to carry out complex forms of behavior is such that the hypothesis of 
consciousness would arise if it did not occur in addition as a datum of our own experience; nor, 
having arisen, does it provide a useful explanation of the phenomena observed in those domains” 
(Gray, 1995, p. 660). As such, we are in a quandary at this point if we wish to retain a substance 
monist view. Despite its attractions, Dennett’s model does not really solve this problem, being as 
it at most provides a plausible mechanism by which purely physical brain activity could result in 
the experience of a (perhaps illusory) subjective consciousness, but not how consciousness is the 
necessary consequence of such activity. Feyerabend (1963) “solves” this problem before it 
begins, by suggesting mental events do not exist at all, and Pinker (2015) solves it by treating 
consciousness as a simple brute fact, which we may not ever be able to grasp, and which has no 
importance in terms of how the mind works. Neither approach is attractive, with one dismissing a 
fundamental part of our actual experience of the world as illusory, and the other suggesting it is 
essentially unknowable.  
Nagel (2002, 2012) approaches this issue by speculating that the only logical way 
forwards is to consider neither the physical nor mental alone as an adequate representation of 
reality, and instead to look for a third concept, which contains both physical and mental as 
necessary constitutive components (rather than simply correlated or causally / contingently 
related). The characteristics of such a concept appear to currently be out of reach, but Nagel 
(2002) goes into significant depth to explain exactly what such a concept would need to do in 
order to succeed. Again, we cannot do justice to Nagel’s (2002; 2012) theory in the short space 
we have available, but in essence it would have to be a new theoretical construction, referring to 
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something real, which necessarily explained both the subjective phenomenological experience 
(inside) and the physiological manifestations (outside) of some given experiential episode. For 
example, wanting to work harder on the job so as to attain an objective, or being pleased with 
one’s performance on the job, each have a unique mental phenomenological concept that we 
experience, but also a physiological concept which describes the physical state of the brain 
(located in the reward system of the brain and related to the role of dopamine in the former case, 
and residing in hedonic “hot spots” in the brain in the latter case and involving opioids and 
endocannabinoides, where the physical processes compromising both produce such 
phenomenological experiences as pleasure e.g., Berridge, 2009). The correct way to think of this, 
in Nagel’s view, is to “think that these two ways of referring – by the phenomenological concept 
and the physiological concept – pick out a single referent, in each case rigidly, but that the logical 
link cannot be discovered by inspecting the concepts directly: Rather, it goes only through their 
common necessary link to the referent itself” (Nagel, 2002, p. 44). It is important here to be clear 
that this is not a model where the unspecified new concept causes the mental and physical. 
Rather, that the relationship is constitutive, in that the new concept is such that its being a mental 
state and a brain state are due to the very nature of the concept itself, in that it could be nothing 
else (i.e., it is a necessary truth). Such a theory would also have to explain the connections we see 
between manifestations of relevant phenomena as necessary characteristics of the new concept, as 
well as satisfy what is called upward entailment, in that all the manifest properties of our 
aforementioned experiential episode are completely explained (entailed) by our new 
concept/theory. Only if we do this are we able to conclusively make the claim that brain activity 
without consciousness is impossible or incomplete, because by their definition they would be 
linked necessarily, not contingently, and a p-zombie would be logically impossible. Such a new 
theory would also have to be compatible with the purely physical explanations of the physical 
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components of the same event (in other words it should not contradict what we already know 
about the purely physical aspects of the world).  
Even leaving aside the positing of a partly non-physical entity as Nagel does, this might 
seem a challenging set of criteria, even impossible. However, it should be clear that scientific 
progress has regularly furnished us with theories of exactly this character regarding the physical 
world, which took manifestly contingent and unexplained correlations (such as we currently 
observe between mind and brain), and explained them with a deeper theory and set of concepts 
which accounted for all of the higher-level behaviors. The theory of fire as oxidation, heat as 
molecular movement, and electromagnetic field theory, all convert observable (yet at the time 
mysterious) contingent correlations into necessary consequences of the nature of their newly-
proposed phenomena, converting previously separate phenomena into a single explanation that 
explains both, and providing us with testable hypotheses. For example, “the very same atomic (or 
molecular) agitation that accounts for increased pressure against the walls of the container 
accounts for increased temperature of the gas within” (Nagel, 2002, p. 49), which explains the 
macro-level positive correlation between the observable changes in temperature and pressure of a 
constant volume of gas as necessary due to the underlying property of molecular movement. So, 
a theory of the characteristics stipulated by Nagel is not a scientific impossibility, in fact such 
theories have been posited regularly throughout history. What about the conjecture of some non-
physical concept? Well, whereas Nagel does not provide any real speculations on the nature of 
such a concept, is it too far-fetched for us to consider even the possibility of such a thing? 
Perhaps it is, but given a model of physics which has come up with stranger and stranger purely 
physical explanations, Nagel (2012) suggests perhaps there are other ways of getting to the truth 
other than the substance monist. Nagel himself denies that this is a substance dualist approach a 
la Descartes, which he regards as untenable. However, as explained earlier, Nagel’s approach 
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seems more akin to a property or natural dualism, rather than the neutral monism that he 
occasionally alludes to, hence our characterization of it in Figure 1. In this sense, he argues that 
his approach is reductive in nature, but not physicalist, that consciousness can be reduced, but not 
purely to physical matter. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3 provides a necessarily stylized and simplistic take on both positions that have 
been discussed, using the same concepts as Figure 2’s model for ease of understanding. Whereas 
we do not claim these representations to be perfect, we think they provide a useful comparative 
take on the issues, and should help readers grasp the concepts of importance. We take a 
reasonably agnostic view at this point on which of these basic positions best represent the truth of 
the matter, but nevertheless, one or the other seemingly must be true. Either the brain is identical 
to the mind, or it is not. They are the universe of possibilities, necessarily. Of course, Dennett’s 
and Nagel’s approaches are far from the only specific ways of theorizing about these two 
possibilities. However the implications of all approaches to each of the conjectures are basically 
the same. As was shown above, both lead to some discomfiting conclusions, and neither is 
without cost in terms of implications for organizational (and general social science) research. On 
the one hand, unless organizational science wishes to become in essence a branch of functional 
neuroscience, a place needs to be found for our subjective experiences and higher-level 
phenomena of organizations and groups (Healey and Hodgkinson, 2014). This is at the roots of 
criticisms such as those of Lindebaum and Zundel (2013). Yet, discomfort with the implications 
of reductionism alone is not enough to discount the possibility that indeed, it may be the truth. If 
we wish to maintain a valid place for organizational research in science, we must provide some 
reasonable defense for the position that mental concepts are valid explanatory mechanisms in 
organizational theories. Indeed, specific variants of this general challenge face all social science, 
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whether we like it or not. The last half of this article explores some options aimed at pointing to a 
reconciliation or convergence in points of view. 
We believe that management / organizational (and to a large extent social / psychological 
in general) researchers have in the main not realized that taking a position on these issues has 
important implications for doing valid research, just as understanding the technology and 
experimental paradigms of neuroscience does. Yet where there are many articles on the latter in 
the organizational literature, there are virtually none on the former. Certainly, it seems to us that 
substance monism is the (perhaps unspoken) position assumed by many organizational / 
management scholars to underlie the neuroscientific approach (although see our later discussion 
under limitations where the critical management perspective is considered). That said, it could be 
that practicing organizational researchers place this issue in the “too hard” basket and carry on 
doing what they do as a pragmatic matter, which to date has been to accept neuroscience’s 
reliance on reductionism. However, any approach, pragmatic or otherwise, will use concepts 
whose conceptual/logical foundation is in need of analysis, and likely falls under one or more of 
the positions regarding the philosophy of consciousness and mental events noted earlier in the 
article.  
Below, we elaborate on the specific issues of importance for neuroscientific 
organizational research which we believe are considerably under-appreciated at present, and 
present an attempt to derive a logically and conceptually coherent framework for future empirical 
work in the area. In particular, we make a tentative attempt to use an essentially functionalist 
methodological framework (with certain modifications or deviations also considered) to 
approach, or at least not contradict, the operationalization of Nagel’s conceptualization of the 
mind-body problem, which does not reject the possible reality of subjective mental experiences. 
That said, Nagel’s approach is too underdeveloped to receive explicit operational consideration in 
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our presentation. As such, in a more pragmatic sense, we show how researchers can employ 
existing neuroscientific, behavioral, and social-psychological methods in parallel to generate 
more valid insights into important organizational research problems. 
FUNCTIONALISM AND THE NATURE OF MENTAL STATES (AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS) 
We have sketched above the main principles of the various approaches to theorizing about the 
nature of subjective mental phenomena like consciousness. However, because the space available 
to our presentation does not allow us to elaborate further on the many philosophical doctrines 
regarding the nature of mental states, we have chosen to use functionalism as an organizing 
framework to speak about a number of contentious issues. Whereas functionalism has primarily 
become associated with reductionist explanations, functionalism itself in different forms can 
underpin both reductive and non-reductive philosophical perspectives on consciousness.  We also 
consider approaches akin to functionalism but deviating in interesting ways. 
 In organizational research that deals with consciousness or mental phenomena, it is 
helpful to consider different levels of analysis. The most basic level, potentially applicable to 
organizational research, concerns chemical, physical, or molecular explanations of organizational 
behavior; above this level are cognitive, emotional, motivational, or volitional variables involved 
in such explanations as social identity, attachment styles, emotional engagement, inspirational 
leadership, and intuitionist ethics in organizations; and at a higher level yet are such larger scale 
phenomena as cooperation, power, and other organizational interpersonal or small group 
processes, and macro organizational phenomena. Under reductionism, the middle and higher 
levels are in some sense identical, reducible, or partially reducible to the most basic level, or 
perhaps alternatively might be thought to emerge from them. 
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 Assuming that organizational research desires to interpret or represent the nature of 
consciousness or mental variables, rather than eliminating them altogether or assuming them 
away, one or more of the many varieties of functionalism provide a way of doing this. Indeed, 
most research in neuroscience and psychology, upon which organizational researchers are 
beginning to draw upon, follows explicitly or implicitly some variant of functionalism. Formally, 
Figure 4a presents a simple schematic of a basic functionalist model. (note that one deviation 
from classic functionalism, which treats the mediating variables or processes as hypothetical, is 
the alternative where such variables or processes are measured; see Figure 6 and accompanying 
discussion below). 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 Importantly, functionalism is agnostic in terms of whether mental states exist, are real, or 
are physical or nonphysical (Block, 2007b). To take a general example of functionalism in 
organization research, consider Figure 4b. Here a visual stimulus manipulation is administered 
(e.g., photos of emotionally-charged scenes versus a control group stimulus lacking emotional 
content); this serves as input to a cognitive event that is hypothesized in some way to transform 
exposure to the stimulus; and a causal output, say in the form of a behavioral reaction or action, is 
measured and predicted to occur according to a theory linking causal input, to cognitive response, 
to causal output. In a neuroscience context, the general form here is expressed in Figure 4c, 
which is a baseline for elaborations developed hereafter. Perhaps the most useful elaborations on 
functional approaches are the following. Instead of limiting functional investigations to single 
levels of inquiry, such as predictions of brain states, it is informative to combine levels of 
analysis within any particular study. For example, the study of consciousness or mental states can 
be enhanced by employing both brain state measurements and subjective measurements as causal 
outputs, where both of these are linked explicitly according to theory (or theories) to the proposed 
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consciousness or mental state. Cacioppo and Decety (2011, p. 169) describe the general logic of 
one form of multilevel research as follows: “breaking down the component of interest and 
showing how, based on the prior literature on the brain, different predictions about what circuits 
should be activated can be derived from two or more theories”. 
 An example of one variant of multilevel research is shown in Figure 5a. Here causes of a 
hypothesized mental event (or process) are manipulated along with a control condition, and two 
physical, behavioral outputs are registered. Notice the two outputs are shown correlated (see r 
and curved line connecting them). The brain state(s) and measured subjective state response(s) 
are parallel outcomes of the hypothesized effects of the mental event. Each outcome could be 
predicted by different theoretical processes, where the processes might be governed by different, 
but also possibly overlapping, mechanisms. Depending on the level of explanation and 
representation of the mental event and its predictions, the linkages from mental event to the 
outcomes could consist minimally of two different (but possibly overlapping) brain circuits, one 
brain circuit and one folk psychology mental event, or two folk psychology mental events (see 
discussion of folk psychology below). The larger the number of physical, behavioral, and mental 
outputs measured and the greater the correlations among them, the greater the behavioral 
evidence for the conceptual foundation underlying the theory of the hypothesized mental event. 
This is analogous to the notion of convergent validity as operationalized in construct validity 
studies. Moreover, by including one or more additional behavioral measures of outputs, where 
these are expected to have no or at least weaker theoretical connections to the mental level under 
scrutiny, we would obtain further evidence of validity, in this case discriminant validity (see 
Bagozzi, 2011b, for a discussion of construct validity, how to test for it, and related issues). 
[Figure 5 about here] 
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 There are different kinds of theoretical specifications linking hypothesized consciousness 
or mental states or processes to behavioral outputs. One example is shown in Figure 5b. Here 
researchers were studying theory of mind processes (i.e., the ability to infer the mental states or 
volitions of other people) in sales account managers, which they manipulated through one 
experimental and two control groups (where the former was a number of audio narratives of 
theory of mind processes transpiring between salesperson and customer, and the latter were 
narratives for a control with no interpersonal mentalizing processes and a control with unlinked 
sentences, see Dietvorst et al., 2009). Two classes or levels of behavioral outcomes were 
measured: one consisted of brain states measured by fMRI and found in previous research to 
capture theory of mind processes (medial prefrontal cortex, temporal poles, temporo-parietal 
junction activation); the other was a 4-dimensional, 13-item psychological scale derived to 
measure subjective report estimates of theory of mind (ToM) processes. The overall ToM scale 
correlated r = .69 with the activation of the right, and r = .61 with the activation of the left, 
temporo-parietal junctions, and r = .69 with the activation of the medial prefrontal cortex levels 
of activation. The correlations between the activation of the temporal poles and ToM scale did 
not reach statistical significance (not shown in Figure 5b for simplicity). Figure 5b shows a case 
of functionalism where hypothesized conscious states are related to outcomes directly linked to 
these specific conscious states, according to theory and past research. 
 Another kind of theoretical specification linking hypothesized consciousness or mental 
states or processes to behavioral outputs is shown in Figure 5c. Here researchers were studying 
empathy processes in sales account managers, which they manipulated with video clips of people 
expressing positive and negative emotions, and neutral faces and moving geometrical shapes 
were used as two control conditions (Bagozzi et al, 2012). Two classes or levels of behavioral 
outcomes were measured: one was comprised of brain states (measured by fMRI procedures) that 
FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH 
!
!
24!
previous research showed indicated activation of mirror neurons (supplemental motor area, 
precentral gyrus, post central gyrus, pars opercularis/pars triangularis), executive functions 
(precuneus R, precuneus L), perception (inferior parietal lobule, superior parietal lobule), facial 
recognition (fusiform gyrus), and a 5-item scale, measuring subjective report estimates of 
customer orientation. Unlike the ToM study described above, where subjective reports as output 
behaviors directly matched the mental state of theory of mind (Figure 5b), in this study empathy 
was the mental state to be captured by a functionalist argument, but the subjective behavioral 
output was an expression or outcome of empathy, not direct measures of empathy, designed to 
capture behavioral orientations toward others based on empathy (in the form of customer 
orientation). The customer orientation scale correlated r = .55 with the supplemental motor area, r 
= .72 with the precentral gyrus, r = .72 with the post central gyrus, r = .67 with the pars 
opercularis/pars triangularis, r = .57 with the right precuneus, r = .57 with the left precunles, r = 
.54 with the inferior parietal lobule, r = .68 with the superior parietal lobule, and r = .57 with the 
fusiform gyrus (where, by referring to these regions in the brain, we mean their activation 
compared to a control group(s)). 
 A third kind of theoretical specification linking hypothesized consciousness or mental 
states or processes to behavioral outputs is shown in Figure 5d. Here researchers were studying 
Machiavellianism in sales account managers. Machiavellianism is a mental, social condition 
characterized by the manipulation of others for personal gain. It seemingly shows some similarity 
to psychopathy, which Baron-Cohen (2011) asserts reflects a deficit in empathy. The study in 
question manipulated two distinct facets of empathy: taking the perspective of others, a cognitive 
state, and feeling the emotional state of others, an affective state (Bagozzi et al., 2013). The 
authors manipulated ToM and (affective) empathy in two separate studies (see Figure 5d). Using 
brain state predictions similar to those described above for ToM (Dietvorst et al., 2009) and 
FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH 
!
!
25!
empathy (Bagozzi et al., 2012), the authors found that Machiavellianism is associated with 
depressed ToM processes in the form of reduced perspective taking, and elevated empathy in the 
form of automatic (not conscious) resonance with the feeling of others. The correlations of 
subjective responses on a Machiavellianism scale with the respective brain states summarized in 
Figure 5d confirmed these results. Thus two commonly thought dimensions of empathy, which 
have been presumed to go together and even define empathy (based on self-report research in the 
literature) were, in fact, found to be disassociated and relate in opposite ways, when brain states, 
measured with fMRI, and subjective reports, measured with an established scale, were employed. 
Here two mental states thought to underpin Machiavellianism (a cognitive state of perspective 
taking based on ToM predictions; and an affective state of empathy based on psychological 
theory) achieve meaning through their transformative role between the causal manipulations and 
dual causal outputs (i.e., multiple brain state measurements and subjective report measures of 
Machiavellianism, where each class of output was linked via two theories and prior research to 
the proposed cognitive and affective mental events). 
MULTILEVEL NEUROSCIENCE RESEARCH AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
VALIDITY 
Multilevel neuroscience research such as illustrated above serves to deepen understanding by 
addressing both internal and external aspects of validity of inquiry. We can think of multilevel 
research as grounding neuroscience in physical and subjective phenomena. Three principles 
proposed by Cacioppo and Bernston (1992; see also Cacioppo & Decety, 2009) apply when 
behaviors across levels of mental organization are investigated. The principle of multiple 
determinism maintains that any behavior at one level of organization can have multiple 
antecedents within or across levels of organization. This implies that any behavioral phenomenon 
at one level of organization can function to explain another variable at the same or different 
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levels. The principle of nonadditive determinism claims that the whole is not necessarily 
predicted by the simple sum of its parts. For example, a psychological response may not be 
decomposable and explicated by specification of other neurological processes by themselves, but 
only in conjunction with differences in behavior at an interpersonal, group, or other social level 
(see Cacioppo & Bernston, 1992, p. 1024, for a specific case). Finally, the principle of reciprocal 
determinism asserts that mutual influence can occur between biological and social variables to 
determine behavior. This should not be interpreted necessarily as simultaneity or mutual 
causation within a single point in time, we would assert, but rather typically occurs recursively, 
such as might happen when social variables influence psychological variables through their 
effects on certain neural processes. Other consequences and directions of effects might transpire, 
such as reflected in so-called downward causation or emergent phenomena. For a multilevel 
example where social and biological levels of analysis complement each other, see Cacioppo et 
al. (2000). 
 A purely substance monist account is not compatible with the issues outlined above (e.g. 
Kim, 1993). Yet by crossing levels of analysis as described above, and in accordance with the 
three grounding principles, one obtains deeper means into internal validity and richer extensions 
into external validity of mental phenomena than can be normally obtained with single-level 
research. Such an approach to research provides a window into consciousness or mental events 
not easily viewed through the narrow prisms of the individual philosophical points of view on 
consciousness noted in Figure 1 by themselves. Rather, by combining physical behaviors (e.g., 
brain states or activations) with measured subjective experiences and crossing levels of analysis, 
as guided by the grounding principles mentioned above, we perhaps take a small step in the 
direction sketched by Nagel’s (2012)  proposal that (albeit never specified in detail) 
consciousness is something more than physical matter and in some way requires, what he terms, 
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both an ahistorical constitutive account grounded in physical phenomena (either reductive or 
emergent) and a historical account rooted in intentionality and evolutionary principles. 
 Organizational research resides squarely in the dialectical tension between basic research 
and applied research. We have emphasized more the basic or scientific side of organizational 
neuroscience in this article, although we believe the multilevel approach we have outlined 
bridges basic research and applied research through concerns with internal and external validities, 
which attempt to connect consciousness with behaviors, theory, and subjective experiences. But 
being also a professional field, organizational neuroscience, we would argue, should go beyond 
internal and external validity, as discussed above, to consider more explicitly ecological validity. 
One way to do this has been practiced within each of the three studies mentioned in Figures 5b-
5d. That is, implications of the mental states that were studied with measurements of brain states 
and subjective experiences, within an experimental functionalist paradigm, were then further 
tested in the field with survey methods on new samples of managers (see Dietvorst et al., 2009; 
Bagozzi et al., 2012; Bagozzi et al., 2013). Going further, the comparatively simple task of 
incorporating higher-level organizational and social phenomena in the framework would allow 
(at least in our view) an operationalization of the critical realist framework put forward by Healey 
and Hodgkinson (2014). Below, we provide three other ways to add to or qualify multilevel 
research, and challenge pure functionalism.  
SUPERVENIENCE, EMERGENCE, AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY 
 Beyond functionalism, the nature of consciousness and mental events can be explored 
through three other philosophical lenses, each of which has appeared briefly above: 
supervenience, emergence, and folk psychology. To explicate these concepts in a way that 
maintains continuity with the discussion so far, and simplify our presentation, we will use 
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functionalism as a framework for illustration, although the terms in question could be discussed 
in other ways. 
 Kim (2005, p. 33) defines mind-body supervenience as follows (see also McLaughlin and 
Bennett, (2014), for a classical definition and history of the concept): 
“Mental properties strongly supervene on physical/biological properties. That is, if any 
system s instantiates a mental property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical property 
P such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything instantiating P at any time 
instantiates M at that time.” 
Supervenience thus expresses or interprets the relationship between properties of mental events 
and physical properties. The relationship is often taken to be a kind of (necessary) dependence, 
not causation, because causality is maintained typically to occur between physical events or 
properties, not between a physical and (nonphysical) mental event or property (Kim, 2005; see 
Bagozzi, 2011b, pp. 93-95). 
 Unlike an identity or reductive relationship between mental events or properties and 
physical events or properties, which are taken to be identical with each other, a supervenience 
relationship maintains the mental event or property gets its meaning in a dependent sense from a 
corresponding physical event or property, and therefore the relationship is nonreductive. Figure 6 
shows a supervenient relationship and contrasts it with functional and causal relationships. Notice 
first in Figure 6a, a hypothetical mental event gets its meaning through the functional 
relationships we discussed above. The relation between the measured brain state and a subjective 
mental event, where both these are presumed to be translated by the hypothetical mental event in 
response to a causal event (e.g., an experimental manipulation) to produce the two causal (in this 
case measured) outputs, is due to the functional connections (i.e., the role played by the 
hypothetical mental event). The relationship between the brain state and subjective mental event 
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is a statistical inferred correlation, r. The relationship could be represented as a function in a 
regression equation, but because the brain state and mental event are measured, perhaps at the 
same point in time, not manipulated, we could not interpret this strictly as a causal relationship, 
hence reference to r. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 Contrast the functional case to the supervenient case in Figure 6b. Here the physical 
manipulation causes a change in a brain state (which can be measured, say, by fMRI), and the 
relation of the brain state to a hypothetical mental event is one of supervenience. If we have two 
physical events and two corresponding hypothetical mental events, the relations might be 
depicted as in Figure 7 (see Kim, 2005, p. 45). Notice here that P1, and P2 are linked causally, and 
M1 and M2 get their meaning from P1and P2, respectively, but no causal relation exists (under 
supervenience) between M1 and M2. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
Now contrast functionalism and supervenience with a causal interpretation of a subjective 
mental event (see Figure 6c). Here an experimental manipulation causes a nearly instantaneous 
change in a brain state, which is measured, and this, in turn, later causes a felt subjective mental 
event, which also is measured. The subjective mental experience, here, has a different etiology 
than under functionalism (Figure 6a) and supervenience (Figure 6b). In addition, under 
functionalism, the qualia-like experience is reflected in the relationship between the hypothetical 
mental event and the subjective mental event (path s in Figure 6a), whereas the qualia-like 
experience under the causal interpretation is represented in the relationship between the physical 
brain state and a measured subjective mental state (path u in Figure 6c). But under supervenience, 
the qualia-like experience is indicated through the relationship between the physical brain state 
and the hypothetical mental event (path t in Figure 6b). The seemingly similar processes depicted 
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in Figure 6 constitute subtle differences in the nature of subjective experience and demonstrate 
that such experience needs to be interpreted within a specific context of theory and method. In 
addition, note that the correlational relationship (r) between the two outputs of the functional 
instance (Figure 6a) provides yet a different interpretation of subjective mental events because 
the observed empirical link between brain state and measured subjective state suggests a 
connection between a physical state and an expressed qualitative interpretation.  Note in Figure 6, 
we use the letters s, t, and u to refer to distinct origins of qualia-like experiences (a subjective 
state in Figure 6a, a hypothetical mental state in Figure 6b, and a subjective state in Figure 6c) 
because the origins of these states and the nature of the concepts linked by s, t, and u are different 
in the three cases presented in Figure 6.  Discussions in the philosophy and neuroscience 
literatures have sometimes confounded these different meanings of consciousness. 
Here, a brief digression is in order concerning the choice of statistical procedures for 
analyzing data under the models shown in Figure 6 (Antonakis et al., 2010).  We thank the 
Associate Editor for pointing out the key issues here.  For the case in Figure 6c, where the 
mediator and dependent variable are measured, it may be necessary to use instrumental variable 
estimation.  Maximum likelihood or two stage least squares procedures might be used here, for 
instance.  Even in cases where the independent variable is manipulated, and the mediator and 
dependent variables are measured, bias in inferring causality can occur (e.g., Bullock, Green, & 
Ha, 2010). Threats to validity still exist, which might require multiple studies to approach each 
threat in order to increase confidence in findings. For example, support for mediation when 
mediator and dependent variables are measured in an experiment might be augmented with an 
additional study where reverse inference from dependent variable to mediator is performed (see 
Limitations at the end of this article), and still other studies might be done where manipulation of 
the mediator and its effects on the dependent variable are scrutinized, and where the dependent 
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variable is switched with the mediator (or even manipulated itself) to see if hypothesized effects 
are consistent or not with findings. Because hypothetical mental events are present in both 
Figures 6a and 6b, different statistical methods are needed here, such as ANOVA or multiple 
regression.   
 The concept of emergence is another nonreductive interpretation of the nature of mental 
events. O’Connor and Wong (2015) define emergence as follows: “emergent entities (properties 
or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with 
respect to them”. Although it has been argued that emergent properties are epiphenomenal and 
therefore do not enter causal relations and do not even exist (Kim, 1999), other interpretations of 
emergence allow for physical properties to determine emergent properties, and for emergent 
properties to influence physical properties and other emergent properties. That said, Nagel (2002) 
criticizes emergence-based theories as positing a link between two unrelated concepts without 
making it knowable, and as such explaining nothing, a view many might agree with. It is beyond 
the scope of this article to consider all the variants, and the limitations and strengths of 
emergence, so we will limit discussion herein to the related topic of folk psychology. 
 Folk psychology plays an important role in philosophy of mind and psychology, and one 
definition that fits our purposes stipulates that folk psychology is “the body of information people 
have about the mind, and it is often regarded as the basis for our capacity to attribute mental 
states and to predict and explain actions” (Nichols, 2002, p. 134). Although some philosophers 
term folk psychology a “bad” theory and recommend that it be “eliminated” (e.g., Churchland, 
1981), others call folk psychology a craft and a type of intentional stance useful to people for 
attributing mental states in others and predicting and influencing the behavior of other people 
(Dennett, 1987). Whether folk psychology is a theory as discussed extensively in the philosophy 
literature (see Ravenscroft, 2010) or an instrumental concept akin to a craft, it has a role to play 
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in organizational science, research, and practice. Folk psychology in everyday behavior often 
affects people’s beliefs, feelings, attitudes, judgment, and behavior (Fletcher, 1995). Moreover, 
folk psychology often informs theory construction in psychology and applied fields that draw 
upon psychology (Fletcher, 1995). It is an open question whether folk psychology can be a basis 
for research into consciousness, from the functionalist perspective or alternatives. 
 We might envision the use of neuroscience in organizational research from multiple 
vantage points. Neuroscience may be used to elucidate the nature of important mental phenomena 
in organizational research. Closely aligned to this purpose, it may be employed to test hypotheses 
explaining and predicting the behavior of workers and managers. Neuroscience may also be 
useful in validating and justifying variables and hypotheses such that researchers might draw 
upon this research to utilize folk psychological variables and theories in basic and applied work, 
when it is not feasible or prudent to do so by applying neuroscience in such studies. 
 We believe that models and tests of decision making, goal-directed behaviors, and social 
action in organizational research can be fruitfully developed based on folk psychology ideas. By 
grounding folk psychology in philosophy of mind theories and developing frameworks linking 
the specification of variables and hypotheses with measurement procedures and conceptual 
criteria in an integrative way, we can gain insight into consciousness and its role in organizational 
life. Figure 8 presents a framework suggesting the principles advocated here, where for 
illustrative purposes we sketch a simple theory of action with variables central to folk 
psychology. Namely, reasons for acting or not are integrated and transformed through a decision 
maker’s desire to act, which, in turn, stimulates an intention to act and then, through intention, 
action is initiated. 
[Figure 8 about here] 
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 Notice in Figure 8 that both mental events and their corresponding physical property 
concepts are linked to measures and realizers through measurement relationships, which could be 
done by questionnaire items in the case of subjective reports of mental events and, say, by fMRI 
in the case of physical brain sates (see the dashed lines, ! ! ! !, in the figure). It should be 
stressed that measurement relationships, analogous to correspondence rules from the philosophy 
of science, reflect empirical, theoretical (e.g., theory of the instrumentation), and conceptual 
criteria describing the relationships between concepts and observations (Bagozzi, 2011b). 
Moreover, the empirical aspects of the measurement relationships typically contain error (random 
and systematic), and to the extent that they do, the theoretical/conceptual meaning of the 
measurements will be contaminated. Thus the measurement links shown in Figure 8 are imperfect 
in a measurement sense. 
 Notice further in Figure 8 that the concepts describing the subjective mental events and 
the concepts describing the physical properties corresponding to them are linked with what we 
term mind-body relationships (see the solid straight lines in the figure,"). We use the general 
term, mind-body relationship, simply to convey that the connection in question can be explicated 
in one of a number of ways. In the case of either pure identity theory or eliminativist 
perspectives, the mind-body relation is one of identity and the mental and physical collapse into 
one entity (i.e., each shares all the properties of the other). An identity theorist and a reductive 
eliminativist might say there are only physical properties (P). An idealist might say there are only 
ideas (M). But perhaps in the most interesting cases, the mind-body relationship becomes a 
particular functional specification in a reductive interpretation, or another kind of functional 
specification in a non-reductive interpretation. An emergent relationship would be another type of 
non-reductive interpretation. Finally, the mind-body relationship could be interpreted as one of 
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supervenience. In sum, what we have labelled as the mind-body relationship in Figure 8 for 
convenience can be interpreted with any one of the major ontological points of view on 
consciousness. Somewhat analogous to the measurement relationship, the different forms of 
mind-body relationships do not in conceptual senses perfectly capture the relationships (except of 
course in the case of identity where the relationship is one of equivalence in the sense of M and P 
having the same properties). Thus, the nature of the linkages between folk psychology subjective 
(i.e., qualitative) mental events and the concepts of the physical events has different, imperfect 
conceptual interpretations, depending on whether one embraces different functional, 
supervenient, or emergent relationships.  
 Figure 8 also shows two kinds of causality. The classic and common one occurs between 
physical concepts (as inferred, for instance, by inferential statistics based on their measurements). 
These are shown as solid arrows in Figure 8. One physical property, P1, for example, causes 
another physical property, P2 (which would be tested by use of p1 and p2). The second kind of 
causal relation is termed mental causality and is drawn as dashed arrows in Figure 8. We 
acknowledge that the notion of mental causality is in need of development and is a controversial 
issue. It should be acknowledged as well that other kinds of causality might occur but are not 
shown in Figure 8. For example, downward causality might occur from M1 to P2, or upward 
causality from P2 to M3. These too are in need of development and are controversial topics. 
 As a final comment on the general representation of theory of mind and its instantiations 
shown in Figure 8, we would like to point out the following for perspective: the entire framework 
in Figure 8 would be necessary for proposing and testing the implications of any valid 
representation of consciousness. The center and bottom portions of Figure 8 might be used to test 
physical implications of a theory of mind, where, for instance, Granger causality2 (e.g., Bressler 
& Seth, 2011; Kim et al., 2011; Seth, Barrett, & Barnett, 2015) could be applied to fMRI 
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recordings of activation of P1-P4 brain states. The top and center portions of Figure 8 might be 
used to test subjective state implications of theory of mind, where, for example, multivariate 
statistics or an experiment could be applied to M1-M4 subjective mental concepts and their 
measurements (m1 – m4). Of course, to reiterate, the fullest information and test of consciousness 
requires that the entire system of relationships in Figure 8 be examined in a holistic way (say by 
an expanded functionalist investigation and the use of structural equation models in an 
experimental and longitudual study). 
NEUROSCIENCE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND BEYOND 
Up to this point, we have placed special emphasis on philosophical accounts of consciousness 
and have introduced certain concepts, and functional perspectives using these concepts, in order 
to draw explicit links to foundational issues for the investigation of consciousness by 
neuroscience. However, empirical research in neuroscience has to date been much narrower in 
focus and perspective than the topics covered by the philosophical principles we have considered 
herein. We desire now to more explicitly discuss this orientation by neuroscientists and how it 
relates to the concepts and principles we have considered3. 
Most neuroscientists appear to be reductionists, and to believe (or at least behave in ways 
that strongly suggest they implicitly believe) that mental events are fully reducible to physical 
brain events (e.g., Bickle, 2003). With respect to the question of consciousness more narrowly, 
there are at least five theories by neuroscientists that fall within the substance monism 
philosophical tradition we have discussed herein. All five approaches maintain that our brains 
produce consciousness as a subjective mental state (for short reviews of the theories, see Le 
Doux, 2015). Consequently, these approaches are consistent with the characterization shown in 
Figure 6c, where measured brain states lead to or influence subjective experience. 
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Two of the five theories focus on emotional processes. Panksepp (2012), for example, 
explains fear behavior as a distillation of subcortical processes in reaction to a threat, where the 
amygdala influences the hypothalamus which, in turn, influences the periaqueductal gray region 
of the brain. Fear behavior then results. More elaborate conscious feelings of fear occur also as a 
function of these subcortical processes in the neocortex. Damasio (2010) also focuses on 
emotional processes wherein innate emotional behavior and physiological responses become 
somatic markers to induce basic, conscious feelings in the cortex. For him, information to and 
from hormones, viscera, and somatosensory receptors in the body interact with both the 
brainstem (subcortical body-sensing areas) and the thalamus and hypothalamus to undergird what 
he terms, extended consciousness, which plays out in processes in the insular cortex, prefrontal 
cortex, and the somatosensory cortex. 
The other three theories of consciousness in the brain are somewhat more general and less 
developed than those proposed by Panksepp (2012) and Damasio (2010), but they set the tone for 
two, more developed, recent frameworks reviewed below. Sensory processing, especially in the 
visual cortex, plays a key role in consciousness under all these theories (Le Doux, 2015). For 
example, first-order theory maintains that consciousness is fully captured in sensory cortical 
processes (Block, 2007a, b). That is, we process and become aware of a stimulus (phenomenal 
consciousness), and this leads to a cognitive representation of the state of which we become 
aware (access consciousness). An elaboration of this point-of-view is access 
consciousness/attentional amplification theory, wherein prefrontal cortex processes interpret 
visual cortex processing. Higher-order theory claims consciousness begins with some kind of 
first-order representation of sensory information (stimulus representation) that is not consciously 
processed, and then when thought about the stimulus is processed in a higher-order state, leading 
finally to consciousness (i.e. awareness, Rosenthal, 2012). Last, global workspace theory asserts 
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that consciousness arises from the to and fro “broadcasting” of information from working 
memory, on the one hand, and sensory processing, long-term memory, evaluative systems, motor 
systems, and executive functions (attention, focusing, monitoring) on the other hand (Dehaene & 
Changeux, 2011). 
The theories reviewed above might be better characterized as frameworks, for they have 
not been specified in detail, operationalized, and tested to demonstrate the production of 
consciousness. All the general theories specify roles for subcortical processes in consciousness, 
which play out in one form or another to influence subjective experience. To the best of our 
knowledge, however, only two programs of neuroscience research to date provide specific 
consideration of the processes involved at a level of detail, and backed by empirical research, to 
qualify as theories. Let us consider first the work of Le Doux (2015), for it provides an exemplar 
for the role of consciousness within the context of a single, albeit complex, emotional state. 
Le Doux (2015, p. 11) begins with a distinction between the two related emotions of fear 
and anxiety that entail overlapping brain mechanisms: “In fear the anticipation concerns if and 
when a present threat will cause harm, whereas in anxiety the anticipation involves uncertainty 
about the consequences of a threat that is not present and may not occur”. To understand the 
bases for consciousness here and how it arises, consider Figure 9, which is our summary of most 
of the major brain regions and their interconnections discussed by Le Doux (2015) in his 
extensive, ongoing program of research. We discuss first the case of threat. Perception of danger 
in the form of a threat as an emotional stimulus is processed by the sensory thalamus (see far left 
center of Figure 9). The thalamus, in turn, initiates parallel processing of a slow sort, beginning in 
the visual cortex, to take one form of sensory processing as an example, and a faster, nearly 
automatic, processing by the lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA). The information in the LA 
leads quickly to induce behavioral reactions (e.g., freezing, autonomic nervous system (ANS) 
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activity, hormonal production), through its interactions with the central nucleus (CeA) and the 
basal nucleus (BA) of the amygdala. Processing by the LA also leads to actions (i.e., such motor 
responses as escape or avoidance) through the pathway of BA to the bed nucleus of the stria 
terminalis (BNST), to the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), to the ventral pallidum (VP). These 
automatic-like paths of threat processing occur sub-cortically, and although we later can become 
aware of our freezing, ANS, hormal, and motor responses, they are not conscious processes. This 
fast processing route to perceptions of danger, of course, functions to enhance survival in non-
deliberative ways when needed. 
[Figure 9 about here] 
The slow route to processing threat occurs primarily in higher cortical regions as shown in 
Figure 9, and is useful when more detailed, fine-grained thinking functions are needed to deal 
with danger. The visual cortex begins this activity, where one path eventually gets to the LA 
through the tertiary visual cortex, and so also can initiate behavioral reactions and motor 
responses indirectly. Le Doux (2015) stresses that the amygdala has indirect effects on cortical 
processing via the CeA and arousal systems, and direct effects on cortical processing via the BA. 
By arousal systems, Le Doux (2015) means neurons that produce such neuromodulators as 
norepinephrine, serotonin, dopamine, acetylcholine, orexins, and others. He claims that the 
feedback loops (see Figure 9) lead to amplification of processing and ultimately promote the 
emergence of consciousness. Feelings for Le Doux (2015, p. 228), in this case fear, get “their 
characteristic quality (the way they feel)…by the combination of non-emotional ingredients”. 
That is, feelings are peculiar mixtures of sensory processing, brain arousal, survival circuit 
activity (ANS, hormones), feedback from behavioral and physiological reactions, memory, and 
executive functions (attention, monitoring, labeling, attributing). This occurs in working memory 
in the lateral prefrontal cortex and draws upon long-term memory in the hippocampus as well. 
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Anxiety follows similar dynamics, as well as certain distinct activities: “Like fear, anxiety can be 
initiated from the outside…[but] can also be triggered by stimuli that are only weakly associated 
with danger…Novel situations in which one does not know exactly what to expect are also 
triggers of anxiety…[and] anxiety can develop when particular memories or thought…lead to 
worry” (Le Doux, 2015, p. 231). Our qualitative sense of what it feels like to experience fear or 
anxiety are produced, Le Doux (2015) asserts, in working memory to give us such fine-grained 
distinctions as anxiety, apprehensiveness, concern, creepiness, dread, fear, fright, horror, 
nervousness, panic, terror, feeling troubled, and worry, depending on the amalgam of cortical and 
sub-cortical information integrated to produce them. 
Le Doux’s (2015) research shows how a single mental event, fear/anxiety, is produced by 
cortical and subcortical process to shape subjective awareness of these mental representations. It 
is one of the most developed treatments in the literature and only recently appeared in the form 
described above. It falls squarely in a functionalist framework and has been studied this way in 
terms of conditioning and extinction experiments. Fear/anxiety in organizational research is an 
important component of stress in and of itself (e.g., in role conflict) or as part of larger theories 
for coping with stress (e.g., attachment theory). Le Doux’s (2015) research could be paradigmatic 
for studying conscious processes of fear/anxiety in organizational research, or for other emotions 
or constructs. However, although Le Doux (2015) claims that the cortical and subcortical 
processes he has studied produce consciousness (as shown in Figure 6c), this has not been tested 
directly. Most neuroscience research has been of the sort more closely corresponding to Figure 6b 
or Figure 6a, where actual subjective mental events are not included or measured. Multilevel 
research is needed to more directly explore the role of consciousness in neuroscience (see Figure 
5). Here, however, the approaches taken to date have shown that (a) hypothesized mental events 
play an intermediary role explaining both physical brain states and subjective brain states and (b) 
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physical brain states and subjective brain states, dependent on the same intermediary mental state, 
are highly correlated. Whether the correlations are indicative of brain states producing 
consciousness (as in Figure 6c), or consciousness causing brain states (where both are not 
causally related but are associated because of common causes, or express some other 
relationship) remains to be determined. 
A final paradigmatic case for study of consciousness in neuroscience goes beyond the 
investigation of a single mental event, such as emotion, to encompass two fundamental processes 
underpinning much of organizational life. The psycho-social reward system in the brain depends 
on the coordination of several brain regions: “reward processing involves multiple components, 
including one that is motivational (wanting) and another that is hedonic (liking) which rely on 
separate neural networks that can be dissociated under particular circumstance” (Pool et al., 2016, 
p. 126). Common sense and many theories in psychology and organizational studies have long 
assumed that the things we desire are things we like, and the things we like are things we desire. 
But recent research in neuroscience has shown that wanting and liking follow different etiologies. 
So for example, classic understandings of work commitment and job satisfaction may have to be 
reconceived to discover how, or even whether, these two fundamental processes relate to each 
other in particular contexts. 
Motivation has been specified to play out in the wanting neural network, in which it 
occurs in implicit and explicit forms (e.g., Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Anselme & Robinson, 
2015). The former is basically a Pavlovian-based system of learning where unconditioned stimuli 
are paired with conditioned stimuli to comprise an automatic, unconscious motivation. 
Employees, for instance, learn to value rewards inherent in performing certain work tasks that 
are, in turn, linked to sought-for outcomes. Wanting in this sense adds “a visceral oomph to 
mental desires,…corresponds best to decision utility,…[and] could be a mechanism for decision 
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that is distinguishable from both experienced utility (hedonic impact or “liking” the outcome) and 
forecast or predicted utility (expecting in advance to like an eventual outcome)” (Berridge, 2009, 
pp. 378-379). Wanting also underlies a conscious, goal-directed system. It is this system that 
unconscious desires “color…with motivational power, to make them compelling spurs to action” 
(Berridge, 2009, p. 379). 
The other component of the psycho-social reward system captures the hedonic 
experiences (liking) of the rewards employees achieve. Unlike the wanting system that depends 
heavily on dopamine effects in the brain and involves the ventral tegmental area, NAcc, 
anaygdala, insular cortex, VP, and orbitofrontal cortex, the liking system is more localized in a 
small number of brain regions, termed hedonic hotspots, where opioids and endocannabinoids 
function (e.g., Salamone and Correa, 2012). The liking system also overlaps with the wanting 
system in terms of involvement of the NAcc, VP, and orbitofrontal cortex. 
The wanting and liking systems are largely nonconscious. But researchers maintain that 
conscious pleasure is a function of both systems (e.g., Kringelback & Berridge, 2012). We might 
speculate that the nonconscious processes lead to awareness of one’s desires and likes and 
dislikes along the lines suggested by Le Doux (2015) for fear/anxiety. However, production of 
consciousness as a function of wanting and liking is in need of verification and has not been 
studied systematically. The possibility of consciousness influencing wanting, liking, and other 
neurosystems should also be considered. 
The fear/anxiety and the wanting/liking research are early examplars, we suggest, for 
study of how conscious phenomena function in organizational contexts. Lieberman (2010) has 
summarized neuroscience research that can serve as foreshadowings of promising areas for 
substrates of important psychological and social processes, but none of this research has yet to 
explain conscious processes as outcomes of physical brain states to the degree that Le Doux 
FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH 
!
!
42!
(2015) and the other researchers mentioned above have done. The areas with neuroscience 
foundations that Lieberman (2010) reviews are social perception, social inference, self-processes, 
social interaction, attitudes and attitude change, and stereotyping and intergroup processes, 
wherein each of these categories has numerous subcategories such as empathy, mentalizing, 
mirroring, morality, agency, self-control, self-concept, trust and cooperation, altruism, and 
prejudice. There are obviously many opportunities for research in organizational behavior that 
neuroscience concepts and methods can inform.  There is need for conceptualization and research 
into consciousness that construes it as either a product of brain processes or constituted by such 
processes in the sense discussed above by Nagel (2002, 2012), or possibly a determinant of brain 
processes. We hope that the philosophical foundation and methodological framework provided 
herein can help organizational researchers launch new research endeavors with the sound 
conceptual tools needed for success in this regard. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The literature on consciousness and neuroscience is vast, and a number of important issues could 
not be addressed herein. One of these is the notion of reverse inference (see Lee, Senior, and 
Butler, 2012), where the goal is “to infer the likelihood of a particular mental process M from a 
pattern of brain activity A, which can be framed as a conditional probability P(M/A)”, and Bayes’ 
rule applied (Poldrack, 2011, p. 693). Poldrack (2011) reviews recent advances in reverse 
inference, including a rebuttal concerning criticisms of the approach. Whereas discussion of the 
issues here are beyond the scope of our article, it should be noted that the role and interpretation 
of causality are different between the functional approaches considered herein, on the one hand, 
where consciousness gets is meaning from the hypothesized role it plays between a causal 
manipulation and observed behavior, and reverse inference, on the other hand, where base rates 
are needed and the likelihood of a mental event is to be inferred from brain activity. The 
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statistical assumptions between Bayesian and Fisherian/frequentist approaches also entail 
conceptual and practical differences that need to be considered in order to comprehend the issues 
fully and make informed research choices, and as such should be topics for future research. 
 A second important issue that was not possible to consider herein is the relationship of the 
critical perspective in management and social science to neuroscience research. The critical 
perspective in management studies, which entails a massive body of work and follows multiple 
points of view, might be characterized as “a combination of Frankfurt School/radical humanism 
and critical postmodernism” and has “shown how managerial values embedded in language 
systems, social practices, and decision routines have lessened the quality of organizational 
decisions and reduced the capacity to meet important human needs” (Alvesson & Deetz, 2006, p. 
255). We could find no research explicitly relating the critical management perspective to 
neuroscience, although Lindebaum’s (e.g. 2016; Lindebaum and Zundel, 2013) criticism of 
organizational neuroscience does appear to share some commonalities in perspective. Even so, 
we speculate that there are at least two areas for future enquiry that go beyond the simple critique 
of reductionist neuroscience. 
 One area is largely normative and addresses social, cultural, and political issues with 
regard to critical practice (Choudhury, Nagel, & Slaby, 2009). Here implications of neuroscience 
in organizations can be scrutinized to analyse contextual and historical factors with current 
neuroscience research so as to consider what has been termed, “the central goal of critical theory” 
in organizational studies: namely, “to create societies and work places which are free from 
domination, where all members have an equal opportunity to contribute to the production of 
systems that meet human needs and lead to the progressive development of all” (Alvesson & 
Deetz, 2006, p. 259). Such issues as public trust, neuroethics, moral decision making, the role of 
funding agencies, and the assessment of scientific quality are a few concerns for study here (e.g., 
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Schleim, 2014). Lindebaum (2016) touches on a number of these issues, but existing critical 
neuroscience work has gone considerably further, and there seems ample opportunity to draw 
from, and contribute to, such discussions by critical management scholars. 
 The second area that the critical perspective might inform neuroscience research in 
organizations is with regard to the conceptualization of consciousness and how it is investigated. 
Specifically, what is the proper representation of consciousness and its role in management and 
organization studies? Here a critical realist orientation might yield balanced guidelines for 
enquiry (e.g., Healey & Hodgkinson, 2014). Rather than subscribing to a narrow reductive 
physicalism for thinking about consciousness, ideas roughly falling under the rubric of the social 
construction of reality might be better accommodated by use of such orientations as emergentism, 
non-reductive functionalism, dualism, downward causation, and folk psychology, so as to 
provide ideas for translating concepts and prescriptions from the critical turn in organization 
research into neuroscience enquiry in organizations. The role of embodied cognition and the use 
of metaphors in interpretation, expression, and construction of subjective meaning deserve more 
consideration as well if we are to get a sense of what consciousness is. 
 To conclude, the meaning of consciousness is embedded in seemingly opposite or 
irreconcilable and entrenched points of view. A key question underlying all discussions of the 
meaning of consciousness is whether anything beyond the physical exists, such as transcendent, 
supernatural or natural or subjective non-physical entities. Researchers on both sides of these 
issues tend to push inquiry to the extremities with little room for dialogue or reconciliation. We 
suggest that a third path is needed to open-up discussion and consider whether consciousness in 
some sense is unique, whether it sometimes emerges out of physical processes, and even whether 
it sometimes influences physical processes. Our aim in this article has been to consider multiple 
vantage points so as to avoid strident and premature commitments to one perspective or another. 
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But it will take continual struggle and tolerance, we suspect, to arrive at workable frameworks for 
consciousness. Here, we submit, the Principles of Charity and Relevant Evidence (see Glossary) 
from philosophy could be followed by all concerned. 
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Footnotes 
1. Although he is never explicit, Nagel (2002, 2012) himself occasionally implies that he 
considers his position to be a form of “neutral monism” (e.g. 2012, pp. 4-5, see also Sorrell, 
2005). Even so, it seems that a form of property dualism fits Nagel’s key theses more accurately, 
being that traditional neutral monism takes a position where the nature of reality is neither mental 
nor physical (Stubenberg, 2016). Conversely, Nagel’s position favors the view that the nature of 
reality is both. Certainly, some forms of neutral monism take the same position either implicitly 
or explicitly, but in such cases this would seem to place them more in line with a property / 
naturalistic dualist position (see Stubenberg, 2016). 
2. Granger causality is hard to explain briefly, and interested readers are referred to the cited 
works in relation to neuroscience, and also to Granger (2004) and Gujarati & Porter (2008) in a 
more general sense. In essence, Granger causality refers to the ability of one time series to predict 
another, rather than the correlation approach of ordinary regression. Intuitively-speaking, if x and 
y are both time-evolving variables, one says that x Granger-causes y if the predictions of y based 
on its own past values and the past values of x are better than predictions of y based its past 
values alone. Given the philosophical complexity of defining what causality actually is, Granger 
causality is generally considered to find only predictive causality.  
3. By way of further explication, the present discussion was inspired in part by early 
presentations of draft versions of this article. On more than one occasion, neuroscientists raised 
their hands to announce “this is not neuroscience”.  
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FIGURE 1: PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO THINKING ABOUT 
CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
Note: For more extensive definitions and historical commentary, see appendix. 
Approaches*to*
thinking*about*
consciousness
Dualism
Idealism:
Substance*
monism
All$things$are$ideas.
The$mental$is$the$
foundation$for$reality.
Substance*dualism:
Property*dualism*and*
naturalistic*dualism.
People$observe$physical$reality$objectively$from$the$outside,$mental$reality$
subjectively$from$the$inside.
Reductive*physicalism*
(all$things$are$physical;$
conscious$properties$
are$physical$
properties).
Non>reductive*
physicalism
(all$things$are$
physical$but$
conscious$properties$
cannot$be$completely$
reduced$to$the$
physical).
Figure$1.$$Philosophical$approaches$to$thinking$about$consciousness$(for$more$extensive$definitions$and$historical$commentary,$see$Appendix)
Consciousness$and$the$brain$are$two$different$kinds$of$things.
Identity:$Mind$and$brain$are$identical.
Eliminativism:$Some$or$all$mental$states$do$not$exist.
Reductive*functionalism:$Production$of$a$conscious$state$caused
by$a$manipulation$and$resulting$in$an$output,$where$the$
conscious$state$operates$on$the$information$in$the$manipulation$to$
specify$a$functional$property.
Emergentism:$Consciousness$emerges$from$the$brain,$but$is$not$
reducible$to$it.
Non>reductive*functionalism:$The$production$of$a$conscious$state
caused$by$a$manipulation$and$resulting$in$an$output,$where$the$
conscious$state$relates$to$a$functional$property$in$a$say$weaker$than
identity.
Anomalous*monism:$Consciousness$must$be$physical$because
psychological$laws$cannot$exist$in$the$same$sense$as$physical,$yet
consciousness$can$cause$and$be$caused$by$physical$events.
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FIGURE 2: A NAÏVE MODEL OF THE BRAIN-MIND-BEHAVIOR LINK 
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FIGURES 3: COMPARISON OF PHYSICALIST AND NONPHYSICALIST PRINCIPLES 
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FIGURE 4. FUNCTIONALISM 
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FIGURE 5: MULTILEVEL RESEARCH WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FUNCTIONAL 
EXPLANATIONS 
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FIGURE 5: CONTINUED 
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FIGURE 6. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS BETWEEN FUNCTIONAL, 
SUPERVENIENT, AND CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS FOR HYPOTHETICAL VERSUS 
SUBJECTIVE MENTAL EVENTS 
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FIGURE 7 SUPERVENIENCE EXAMPLE 
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FIGURE 8. GENERAL REPRESENTATION OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND APPLIED TO 
A FOLK PSYCHOLOGY EXPLANATION OF ACTION, GROUNDED IN 
NEUROSCIENCE AND SUBJECTIVE MEASUREMENTS.  
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FIGURE 9: FEAR, ANXIETY, AND CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
Note: See text for abbreviations 
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APPENDIX: GLOSSARY 
Dualism (see Robinson, 2016): The theory that the mental and the physical are in some sense 
different kinds of thing. This is most commonly discussed in terms of the mind and the body / 
brain.  
Eliminativism (see Ramsey, 2013): Eliminitivism is synonymous with eliminative materialism. 
This view holds that either some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense / folk 
psychology do not exist.     
Emergentism (see O’Connor and Wong, 2015): If some entity can be said to “arise” out of a more 
fundamental entity or set of entities, yet is somehow novel or irreducible to the lower-level 
entity/entities, it is said to be emergent. Another way of thinking of emergence is as a process by 
way of which larger entities somehow arise from the interactions between smaller / simpler 
entities, and the larger entities exhibit properties that the smaller ones do not. As an example, 
consciousness is sometimes said to be an emergent property of the brain. Emergentism itself is 
simply the belief in emergence.    
Folk psychology (see Ravenscroft, 2016): Folk psychology can be discussed in a number of 
different ways. In one sense, the term folk psychology refers to a set of cognitive capacities 
including the capacity to predict and explain behavior, among others. Folk psychology can also 
be used to refer to a general theory of behavior represented in the brain. In this sense then, the 
cognitive capacities referred to by the first meaning of folk psychology would be underpinned by 
the second meaning of folk psychology. Finally, folk psychology can be conceptualized as a 
theory of human psychology made up of the general everyday common-sense notions about the 
mind that laypeople generally subscribe to. 
Functionalism (see Levin, 2013): Functionalism holds that what makes something a thought, 
pain, desire, or any other mental state is dependent only on its function. That is, the role it plays 
in the system it is a part of. In other words, functionalist theories claim that the identity of a 
mental state is given by its causal relations to (for example) behaviors, other mental states, and 
sensory stimulations. 
Idealism (see Guyer and Horstman, 2015): Idealism can be thought of in at least two ways. 
Epistemological idealism is the view that human knowledge is essentially determined by human 
thought. Ontological idealism holds that epistemological idealism is a source of the truth because 
it is reality itself that is some form of thought. Within contemporary philosophical discourse 
however, idealism seems to be conceptualised in two different ways, a) that reality is ultimately 
founded on, or is in fact exclusively, something mental (e.g. the mind, spirit, reason), or b) that 
although one may concede to the existence of something independent of the mind, everything that 
we could know about mind-independent reality is so steeped in the activities of the mind, that any 
claim to knowledge must in some sense be self-knowledge. Idealism of form a) could be termed 
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metaphysical or ontological idealism, and idealism in form b) could be termed formal or 
epistemological idealism. 
Identity thesis (see Smart, 2014): The argument that mental states and processes are identical to 
the states and processes of the physical brain. 
Neutral Monism (see Stubenberg, 2016): Neutral monism is a variant of monism which holds that 
reality is neither mental nor physical. However neutral monists often also imply that reality is 
both mental and physical. Unfortunately, this tends to confuse neutral monism with other 
theories. Thus, more recent work (Stubenberg, 2016, and also see the present article) recommend 
that neutral monism should instead be taken to refer to the neither interpretation, rather than the 
both. 
Physicalism (see Stoljar, 2016). Physicalism is closely related to a materialist substance monism 
view. It is the view that everything in the universe that is real is physical. To cope with 
contemporary counters (e.g. concerning the mind), sometimes, physicalist views instead argue 
that everything supervenes on the physical.  
Reductionism (see van Riel and Van Gulick, 2016): To say that a given entity a reduces to entity 
b is ultimately to imply that a is nothing more than, or nothing over and above b. In other words, 
b is more basic than a, and a somehow depends on, or is constituted by, b. The ultimate 
expression of reductionism in a scientific context is that everything ultimately reduces to physics 
(e.g. social science reduces to psychology, which reduces to neuroscience, which reduces to 
biology, which reduces to chemistry, which reduces to physics). Obviously, such ideas are not 
universally popular (e.g. see Cartwright, 1999).  
Substance monism (see Schaffer, 2016): The view that all things that exist are of one type. This 
“type” is often considered to be physical matter, but other types of substance monism would 
include mental, or neutral, monisms. 
Supervenience (see McLaughlin and Bennett, 2014): Some property (or set of properties) 
supervenes on another in the case that no two things can differ on the first property/properties 
without also differing on the second. In other words, if A supervenes on B, there can be no 
difference in A without a difference on B. 
The Principle of Charity (see Gutting, 2015): The Principle of Charity requires that we develop 
our arguments on the basis of the most favourable (i.e. most plausible and defensible) 
interpretation of the position of our opponents. 
The Principle of Relevant Evidence (see Gutting, 2015): The Principle of Relevant evidence 
concerns the basis for inductive reasoning. It states that one can rely on a conclusion from an 
inductive argument only if one has strong reason to believe that the premises include all relevant 
evidence. In other words, one must be able to defend the position that there are no other facts or 
evidence that would be likely to alter the conclusion.  
